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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal raises a number of employment law issues 
relating to the recruitment, hiring and later firing of 
appellant, Susan Farrell. The District Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of defendants Planters 
Lifesavers Company and Nabisco, Inc., on all of Farrell's 
claims.1 See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 22 F. Supp. 
2d 372 (D.N.J. 1998). Farrell appeals the dismissal of her 
retaliation and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims 
under Title VII and the dismissal of her North Carolina 
contract law claim.2 Acting as Amicus Curiae, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission supports Farrell's 
appeal from the dismissal of her federal claims. Wefind 
that Farrell established a prima facie case for both federal 
causes of action, and we will reverse the grant of summary 
judgment precluding her retaliation and quid pro quo 
claims. We will, however, affirm the dismissal of her state 
contract law claim. We have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The District Court had 
jurisdiction over the Title VII claims under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331, and exercised jurisdiction over the state law claim 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. Viewing the record from Farrell's 
perspective, the facts in this case are as follows. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Planters Lifesavers Company was an operating company of Nabisco, 
Inc. Subsequently, Planters Lifesavers Company divided into Planters 
Company and LifeSavers Company. Both are operating companies of 
Nabisco, Inc. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the defendants 
collectively as "Planters." 
 
2. Farrell does not appeal the District Court's decision granting summary 
judgment in favor of Planters on her wage discrimination claim. See 
Farrell, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 388-90. 
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I. 
 
In 1992, Planters, then located in Winston-Salem, North 
Carolina, hired Douglas DeLong as its Director of Materials 
Management. One of DeLong's central tasks involved 
formulating a plan to cut operating costs in Planters' 
Materials Management Department. Beginning in the early 
1990s and continuing through 1997, Planters sought to cut 
its operating costs by consolidating its workforce. DeLong 
quickly reorganized the Materials Management Department, 
bringing together the Purchasing, Packaging Services, 
Graphic Design and Production Planning Departments 
within the Materials Management Department and placing 
them all under his direct authority. In August 1993, 
DeLong wrote a memorandum to Norm Jungman, his 
supervisor, suggesting Planters merge the Packaging 
Services and Graphic Design Departments as part of its 
consolidation. DeLong explained that he hoped to merge the 
two departments by late 1994 or early 1995. 
 
In late 1993, Planters decided to discharge the Director of 
Packaging Services, Ronald Yonker. Almost 
contemporaneously, Planters approached Susan Farrell, 
through a recruiter, to become a Packaging Engineer in the 
Packaging Services Department. Based on her 
qualifications, and DeLong's recommendation, Planters 
subsequently considered Farrell as a candidate to replace 
Yonker as Director of the Packaging Services Department. 
At the time, Farrell was a packaging engineer at McCormick 
& Company in Hunt Valley, Maryland. 
 
In January of 1994, Farrell traveled to Winston-Salem to 
interview. By mistake, Planters had Farrell interview with 
Yonker, who did not know of the decision to fire him and 
believed Farrell to be interviewing for another position. 
Concerned about her own job security by virtue of Planters' 
treatment of Yonker, Farrell sought assurances during the 
recruitment process. DeLong assured her that she would 
only be fired for poor performance. A number of individuals 
told her that Yonker had been repeatedly warned about his 
performance before the decision was made to terminate 
him. 
 
Planters formally offered Farrell Yonker's position, re- 
titled as Senior Manager of Packaging Services, by letter 
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dated February 4, 1994. Planters also promised to 
purchase Farrell's home in Maryland for $ 240,000 and pay 
for Farrell's relocation back to Maryland if her employment 
with Planters ended within two years because of 
"performance concerns or position elimination." Farrell 
accepted the offer on February 11, 1994, and relocated to 
North Carolina. She began work at Planters on March 28, 
1994. Farrell's husband remained in Maryland. 
 
In mid-November 1994, Farrell traveled to Chicago to 
attend a Pack Expo, an annual packaging exposition, with 
a number of Planters and Nabisco, Inc. managers. While 
attending the show, DeLong told Farrell that his supervisor, 
Norm Jungmann, was about to be fired and that he would 
assume Jungmann's position shortly. DeLong then praised 
Farrell's work performance, told her that he felt her style 
complemented his, and asked her if she would be interested 
in becoming the head of the Industrial Engineering 
Department in addition to her duties as manager of the 
Packaging Engineering Department once he replaced 
Jungmann. 
 
A few hours later, DeLong asked Farrell to accompany 
him the next day on a planned business trip to Puerto Rico 
to tour a Planters' facility. DeLong instructed Farrell to 
book tickets on the same flight as his, with seats together. 
Farrell made the arrangements. DeLong and Farrell had 
traveled on business trips together on two prior occasions. 
 
During the flight to Puerto Rico on November 16, 1994, 
DeLong placed his hand just above Farrell's knee while 
telling Farrell that his wife became jealous when he traveled 
with Farrell. He asked Farrell whether her husband became 
jealous when she traveled with DeLong. Farrell responded 
by removing his hand from her leg and firmly telling him 
"no, I don't give him a reason to and I suggest you do the 
same." Farrell says DeLong's demeanor changed when she 
rejected his advance: he turned away, curled up and slept 
or pretended to sleep.3 Farrell and DeLong engaged in little 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court refused to consider certain evidence regarding 
DeLong's change in attitude after Farrell rejected his advance because it 
contradicted her deposition testimony. See Farrell, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 381 
n.22 (citing Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 
705-06 (3d Cir. 1988). As we explain, see infra  section II. C, we 
disagree 
 
and will consider the allegation as part of the record in front of us. 
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or no further conversation for the rest of the flight. The next 
day, DeLong flew back to Winston-Salem, informing Farrell 
that he was leaving a day early in order to find out more 
about Jungman's termination. 
 
Farrell also says that DeLong often commented when she 
wore a skirt, and states that in October, DeLong told her 
that she was pretty calm considering she was living apart 
from her husband and that he would be "bitchier" if he 
were her. However, after the November flight, DeLong never 
made reference to the advance on the plane, nor made a 
second advance. 
 
On December 13, 1994, less than a month after the trip 
to Puerto Rico and less than two weeks after Planters paid 
for her possessions to be moved to North Carolina and 
purchased her home in Maryland, Gary Eckenroth, 
Planters' Vice President for Human Resources, went to 
Farrell's office and asked her to come up to his office. On 
the way, Eckenroth told her that Planters was going to 
eliminate her position. Once inside his office where DeLong 
was waiting, Farrell says Eckenroth told her Planters would 
call her termination a position elimination, in order to allow 
Farrell to retain benefits and give her a severance package, 
but that she was actually being terminated because of 
interpersonal problems with other members of Planters' 
management. When Farrell asked for specifics, DeLong 
mentioned Suzanne Jabbour and Ed Lyons. He also made 
general reference to some others whom he did not name. 
After Farrell protested, questioning why Planters had just 
paid for movers and purchased her house in Maryland if 
they were terminating her, Eckenroth said that he did not 
know that Planters had just moved her. Eckenroth then 
asked DeLong to leave the room. Once DeLong left, Farrell 
says that Eckenroth told her that he had not checked 
DeLong's report of complaints and he promised he would do 
so. 
 
The next day, Farrell spoke with Jabbour and Lyons and 
they both denied making negative comments to DeLong, 
but confirmed that DeLong had asked them about her. 
Lyons also told Farrell that he had told DeLong that he felt 
DeLong had a personal problem with Farrell. That same 
day, Farrell says Eckenroth told her that Jabbour and 
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Lyons came to him and confirmed that they had not made 
negative comments about her to DeLong. In fact, DeLong's 
own internal memorandum, dated December 8, 1994 states 
"Ed Lyons said she was helpful with his group." Eckenroth 
also apologized for not having investigated DeLong's claim, 
but told Farrell that she would have to leave because 
rumors of her termination had begun to circulate. A few 
days later, Eckenroth talked to her about accepting the 
severance package in return for releasing her claims. 
Farrell did not agree to any terms of separation and left her 
position on December 28, 1994. 
 
DeLong's memorandum, dated December 8, describes the 
events leading up to Farrell's termination. The 
memorandum refers to three conversations he had on 
December 7 and 8 with various Planters' managers who 
came to DeLong and complained about Farrell. The 
memorandum then refers to a meeting between DeLong and 
Eckenroth, spurred by these conversations, where they 
"discussed the option of eliminating" Farrell's position and 
merging the Packaging and Graphics Departments as 
DeLong had suggested in 1993. 
 
DeLong notes that he spoke with Planters' managers, 
including Jabbour and Lyons, "to gather feedback about 
Farrell." DeLong summarizes their comments: "The most 
common response received was, `I don't know what she 
does.' `A lot of talk but no results.' `Nice suit, but nothing 
in it.' Ed Lyons said she was helpful with his group." 
DeLong then detailed his subsequent conclusions, 
including: 
 
       When all the issues with her peers were discussed and 
       other feedback received discussed, it was clear that I 
       had to deal with Susan. I could not run an area with 
       the type of conflict that existed between Susan and the 
       rest of my staff. 
 
        . . . . 
 
       [b]ased on these discussion and conversations with 
       people over the last several months who found Susan 
       very difficult to work with, i.e., Phil, Mike, Peggy and 
       Rob, I made the decision to eliminate her job and 
       combine Graphics and Packaging under Peggy as per 
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       earlier recommendation and hire another Packaging 
       Engineer. 
 
Farrell alleges that her rejection of DeLong's advance 
resulted in her termination, forming the basis of her federal 
claims. She also argues that DeLong's assurances created 
an implied term in her employment contract permitting her 
termination for cause only. Farrell alleges that Planters 
breached this provision by firing her, forming the basis for 
her state law claim. 
 
Planters disputes many of the facts alleged by Farrell, 
and the inferences that might be drawn from them, and 
describes different reasons for Farrell's termination. 
According to Planters, Farrell was terminated because 
upper management made the decision to consolidate the 
Graphics and Packaging Departments and Planters 
determined that Peggy Bryan, the head of the Graphics 
Department, would better serve Planters than Farrell in the 
consolidated position. According to Planters, Eckenroth met 
with Sandy Putnam, Vice President of Planters, to discuss 
cost containment and reduction measures in November of 
1994 and specifically discussed the possibility of 
implementing DeLong's 1993 proposal that Planters should 
consolidate the Packaging Services and Graphic Design 
Departments in late 1994 or early 1995. 
 
Planters explains that DeLong and Eckenroth met on 
December 8 to discuss the consolidation. At that meeting, 
Eckenroth asked DeLong to make a recommendation about 
whether they should keep Farrell or Bryan, which he did. 
Planters contends that DeLong's December 8 memorandum 
is materially consistent with their explanation for Farrell's 
termination since it describes a discussion about 
consolidating departments, efforts by DeLong to canvass 
opinion about Farrell, and the decision to retain Bryan. 
 
Furthermore, in his certification and deposition 
testimony, DeLong denied ever having suggested to Farrell 
the possibility of a promotion or making the advance on the 
plane. Eckenroth and DeLong also denied that they told 
Farrell that the decision was a position elimination in name 
only during their meeting with Farrell. In their certifications 
and deposition testimony, DeLong and Eckenroth also 
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support the choice to retain Bryan by stating that they 
received complaints about Farrell's availability, ability and 
attitude throughout her employment. Planters points out 
that in the summer of 1994, a peer group gave Farrell the 
mock award title of "phantom leader," and in October, 
DeLong wrote a memorandum to Farrell telling her to 
increase her visibility at Planters. 
 
After her termination, Farrell filed suit. The District Court 
granted Planters summary judgment on all of Farrell's 
claims. Farrell appeals and argues that the District Court 
erred in dismissing her Title VII quid pro quo sexual 
harassment and retaliation claims as well as her North 
Carolina contract law claims. We discuss each in turn, 
beginning with Farrell's Title VII claims. 
 
We exercise plenary review over summary judgment and 
we apply the same standard that the lower court should 
have applied. See Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 
777 (3d Cir. 1994). A federal court should grant summary 
judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
making this determination, "a court must view the facts in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw 
all inferences in that party's favor." Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 
777. 
 
II. 
 
Farrell claims that Planters and Nabisco violated Title VII 
in two separate ways and presents her discrimination claim 
as two different causes of action. She alleges that her 
termination was both an impermissible act of retaliation 
and an act of quid pro quo sexual harassment. In this case, 
it is clear that both of Farrell's claims rely upon the same 
essential facts: DeLong's sexual advance, her rejection of 
the advance and her subsequent termination. 
 The District Court determined that Farrell failed to 
produce evidence showing a causal link between the 
rejection and her termination, as is required to establish a 
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prima facie case for each claim. Considering Farrell's 
retaliation claim, the District Court first determined that 
the three to four week period between the rejection and the 
termination was insufficient alone to establish the causal 
link. The court then searched the record for evidence of a 
"pattern of antagonism" or a "retaliatory animus." Finding 
none, the District Court granted the defendant's motion as 
to Farrell's retaliation claim. The District Court dismissed 
Farrell's quid pro quo sexual discrimination claim in a 
similar manner. Relying heavily upon Lynch v. New Deal 
Delivery Serv., Inc., 974 F. Supp. 441 (D.N.J. 1997), the 
Court dismissed Farrell's claim because there was no 
evidence that DeLong either acted hostilely towards Farrell 
after she rejected his advance or pressed the issue again. 
 
For the reasons described below, we conclude that the 
District Court erred by requiring that the causal connection 
for both claims be supported by a pattern of antagonism, 
retaliation or hostility and, thereby, engaged in too narrow 
a review of the plaintiff 's evidence. Considering the record 
before us, we find ample evidence from which to infer a 
causal connection between Farrell's rejection of DeLong's 
advance and her subsequent termination that enables 
Farrell to make out a prima facie case for both her claim of 
retaliation and her claim of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment. Since we find that Farrell makes out a prima 
facie case on all the evidence before us, we need not decide 
whether the three to four week period between the advance 
and termination would be sufficient, if considered alone. We 
note that the District Court did not reach the issue of 
whether Planters and Nabisco proffered a legitimate non- 
discriminatory reason for Farrell's termination or whether 
Farrell could illustrate that the reason was pretextual, so 
we will reverse and remand to the District Court for 
consideration of those issues. We will discuss the 
requirements for Farrell's prima facie case of retaliation and 
quid pro quo sexual harassment in that order. 
 
A. 
 
Under our precedent, to advance a prima facie case of 
retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the employee 
engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) the employer 
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 took an adverse employment action after or 
contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; 
and (3) a causal link exists between the employee's 
protected activity and the employer's adverse action. See, 
e.g., Kachmar v. Sungard Data Systems, Inc. , 109 F.3d 173, 
177 (3d Cir. 1997); Jalil v. Advel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 
(3d Cir. 1988); see also Krouse v. American Sterilizer 
Company, 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the 
third requirement as a "causal connection"). 
 
The District Court determined that Farrell failed to 
establish the third element of the prima facie case. 4 It 
reasoned that "a temporal proximity of three to four weeks 
may support an inference of retaliation," but held "[a]bsent 
evidence of intervening antagonism or retaliatory animus 
. . . Farrell has failed to establish a causal link between her 
rejection of DeLong's advance and her termination. Thus, 
Farrell has not established a prima facie case of 
retaliation." Farrell, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 393. The District 
Court limited its inquiry into whether Farrell offered any 
non-temporal proof of causation to evidence of a"pattern of 
antagonism" or "retaliatory animus" and,finding none, 
dismissed her claim. See id. (citing Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 
177 and Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503-04). We think this 
analysis viewed too narrowly the scope and nature of 
conduct and circumstances that could support the 
inference of causation. The District Court seemed to have 
been requiring more than one retaliatory act, or one closer 
in temporal proximity, or some demonstrative activity, to 
the exclusion of all other facts or events potentially 
probative of causation. In doing so, it committed error. 
 
We have spoken often of the probative value of temporal 
proximity in retaliation cases. Recently in Robinson v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997), and Krouse v. 
American Sterilizer Co., we remarked that our case law is 
"seemingly split" as to whether temporal proximity between 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We note that the District Court held that the rejection of a sexual 
advance was a protected activity, see Farrell , 22 F. Supp. 2d at 392, and 
that determination has not been questioned on appeal. Therefore, we do 
not need to address it. Farrell's termination clearly establishes the 
second prong. 
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the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory act can be 
sufficient in itself to create an inference of a causal 
connection for the purposes of a prima facie case of 
retaliation. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh , 120 F.3d at 
1302; see also Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503 (finding period of 
nineteen months insufficient on summary judgment). 
However, we caution that this "split" is not an 
inconsistency in our analysis but is essentially fact-based. 
Rather, we have ruled differently on this issue in our case 
law, depending, of course, on how proximate the events 
actually were, and the context in which the issue came 
before us.5 
 
For example, in Jalil v. Avdel Corporation, 873 F.2d 701 
(3d Cir. 1989), we reversed the grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff had 
established causation for the purposes of his prima facie 
case merely by showing that his discharge occurred only 
two days after his employer had received notice of Jalil's 
EEOC claim. See Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708 ("He demonstrated 
the causal link between the two by the circumstance that 
the discharge followed rapidly, only two days later, upon 
Avdel's receipt of notice of Jalil's EEOC claim."). However, 
in Krouse, also a case appealing the grant of summary 
judgment, we explained that temporal proximity alone will 
be insufficient to establish the necessary causal connection 
when the temporal relationship is not "unusually 
suggestive," and determined that nineteen months was too 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We do note that our pronouncements regarding temporal proximity 
and causation need to be assessed with the understanding that the 
relative evidentiary impact of temporal evidence may vary depending 
upon the stage of the McDonnell Douglas proof analysis, and the 
procedural circumstance. We caution, therefore, that each case must be 
considered with a careful eye to the specific facts and circumstances 
encountered. See Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 178 ("Our cases set no 
parameters but were decided in the context of the particular 
circumstances before us."). There is clearly a difference between two 
days and nineteen months. Compare Jalil, 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 
1989), with Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503. There is also a difference between 
a plaintiff relying upon temporal proximity to satisfy her prima facie 
case 
 
for the purpose of summary judgment, see Jalil , 873 F.2d at 708, and 
to reverse a verdict. See Quiroga v. Hasbro Inc. , 934 F.2d 497, 500, 501- 
02 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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attenuated to create a genuine issue of fact. See Krouse, 
126 F.3d at 503 (citing Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1302). In this 
case, Farrell, supported by the EEOC, asks that wefind 
that the relatively short period in question sufficient to 
establish the inference of causation required at this stage.6 
However, because we find that she establishes the inference 
on the entire record before us, including the suggestive 
timing, we need not decide whether the timing alone would 
be sufficient. 
 
In the case before us, the District Court required 
additional evidence of "intervening antagonism or 
retaliatory animus," after it opined that the timing of three 
to four weeks "may" support an inference of causation. In 
essence, it held that if temporal proximity is not clearly 
suggestive standing alone, a "time plus" other intervening 
retaliatory acts will be required. We part ways with the 
District Court, because while we agree that timing plus 
other evidence may be an appropriate test where the 
temporal proximity is not so close as to be "unduly 
suggestive," we disagree as to the character of the "other" 
evidence that will suffice to create the causal link for 
purposes of the prima facie case. The District Court drew 
its reasoning from our statement in Kachmar that "[w]here 
there is a lack of temporal proximity, circumstantial 
evidence of a `pattern of antagonism' following the protected 
conduct can also give rise to the inference." See Farrell, 22 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In its brief, the EEOC's principal argument is that the temporal 
relationship between the rejection of DeLong's advance and Farrell's 
termination is sufficient on its own to demonstrate the inference of 
causation Farrell needs to establish a prima facie case at this procedural 
stage. We do not to decide this issue. 
 
Following argument, the EEOC brought to our attention a recent 
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Farley v. 
Nationwide Mutual Ins., Co., No. 98-4566, 98-4799, 1999 WL 1142914 
(11th Cir. Dec. 14, 1999). In Farley, the Eleventh Circuit found that a 
period of seven weeks was sufficient to establish the required causal 
connection. See id. at *12. We note, however, that the Eleventh Circuit 
in Farley seems to apply a less stringent test for causation in general, 
see id. at *12 ("To prove a causal connection, we require a plaintiff only 
to demonstrate `that the protected activity and the adverse action were 
not wholly unrelated.' "), and, thus, its ruling is inapposite. 
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F. Supp. 2d at 393 (quoting Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177). 
However, it failed to note the succeeding sentence, which is 
all-important: "These are not the exclusive ways to show 
causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, 
may suffice to raise the inference." Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 
177. 
 
Although timing and ongoing antagonism have often been 
the basis for the causal link, our case law clearly has 
allowed a plaintiff to substantiate a causal connection for 
purposes of the prima facie case through other types of 
circumstantial evidence that support the inference. For 
example, a plaintiff may establish the connection by 
showing that the employer gave inconsistent reasons for 
terminating the employee. See Waddell v. Small Tube 
Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986); see also 
EEOC v. L.B. Foster Co., 123 F.3d 746, 753-54 (3d Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1147 (1998). In Waddell, we 
noted that the District Court could "appropriately" have 
taken inconsistent explanations into account infinding the 
causation necessary to satisfy the prima facie case. See 
Waddell, 799 F.2d at 73 ("The district court noted the 
inconsistency in Small Tube's explanations of its refusal to 
rehire and could appropriately have taken that into 
account."). In L.B. Foster Co., we noted that the plaintiff 
had established a prima facie case of retaliation based on 
temporal proximity between the events plus inconsistencies 
in the defendant's testimony, certain conduct towards 
others, and refusals to provide a reference for the plaintiff. 
See L.B. Foster, 123 F.3d at 753-55 (citing Waddell, 799 
F.2d at 73). 
 
In Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 
1997), we limited our inquiry to evidence of a pattern of 
antagonism, but only because that evidence was sufficient 
on its own to link the complaints of discrimination and 
Woodson's discharge. See id. at 921. We specifically stated 
that we "need not consider whether other types of evidence 
might also support a causal link finding in the absence of 
temporal proximity." Id. at 921 n.3. Similarly, in Robinson 
v. SEPTA, 982 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1993), the intervening 
pattern of antagonism was so strong that it overcame the 
lack of temporal proximity and, alone, proved the causal 
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link. See id. at 895. There was no need to look beyond this 
pattern for other, circumstantial, evidence. 
 
Moreover, we have been willing to explore the record in 
search of evidence, and our caselaw has set forth no limits 
on what we have been willing to consider. In Krouse, we 
affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment 
after concluding that the plaintiff "has not proffered any 
evidence establishing a causal connection" other than the 
nineteen month gap between filing an EEOC complaint and 
the alleged retaliatory act. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503. We 
noted there that "[w]hen temporal proximity between 
protected activity and allegedly retaliatory conduct is 
missing, courts may look to the intervening period for other 
evidence of retaliatory animus." Id. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 
employed too restrictive a view of the type of evidence that 
can be considered probative of the causal link. It is not 
limited to timing and demonstrative proof, such as actual 
antagonistic conduct or animus. Rather, it can be other 
evidence gleaned from the record as a whole from which 
causation can be inferred. As we explained in Kachmar, "[i]t 
is important to emphasize that it is causation, not temporal 
proximity [or evidence of antagonism], that is an element of 
plaintiff 's prima facie case, and temporal proximity [or 
antagonism] merely provides an evidentiary basis from 
which an inference can be drawn." Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 
178. Before viewing the record with this wider lens, 
however, we will focus briefly on the District Court's 
decision that Farrell had not satisfied the same element -- 
namely causation -- with respect to the prima facie case for 
her claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. 
 
B. 
 
Farrell's companion claim of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment contains a similar requirement of cause and 
effect. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 
1296 (3d Cir. 1997). In Robinson -- one of the few cases in 
which we have shed light on this issue -- we stated that a 
plaintiff may prove a claim of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment by showing that "his or her response to 
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unwelcome advances was subsequently used as a basis for 
a decision about compensation, [terms, conditions, or 
privileges or employment]." Id. at 1297. We further 
explained that "the plaintiff need not show that the 
submission was linked to compensation, etc., at or before 
the time when the advances occurred. But the employee 
must show that his or her response was in fact used 
thereafter as a basis for a decision affecting his or her 
compensation, etc." Id. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment to 
Planters on Farrell's quid pro quo claim finding that she 
failed to establish the causal connection required by 
Robinson. The District Court used the test for satisfying the 
prima facie stage that had first been set forth by the Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). See Farrell, 22 F. 
Supp. 2d at 386 ("(4) her submission to the unwelcome 
advances was an express or implied condition for receiving 
job benefits or her refusal to submit resulted in tangible job 
detriment.") (emphasis added). Curiously, however, the 
District Court relied almost exclusively on Lynch v. New 
Deal Delivery Serv. Inc., 974 F. Supp. 441, 452 (D.N.J. 
1997) -- a case based on diversity jurisdiction focusing 
exclusively on New Jersey state law -- to conclude that 
Farrell's causation evidence fell short because, like the 
plaintiff in Lynch, Farrell did not produce any evidence that 
DeLong "pressured her" or "acted hostile toward Farrell 
after she rejected his advance." See Farrell , 22 F. Supp. 2d 
at 387-88. 
 
Farrell contends that the District Court erred infinding 
that she had not adduced evidence sufficient to establish 
the causal relationship required by Robinson. We agree and 
will reverse because we believe that -- by relying upon 
Lynch -- the District Court departed from our decision in 
Robinson and -- much as it did with respect to its analysis 
of the retaliation claim -- incorrectly narrowed the scope 
and nature of its assessment of the causation evidence. As 
we will explain below, we view the evidence as sufficient to 
establish this causal link as well. 
 
In Lynch, the plaintiff raised a number of discrimination 
claims, including quid pro quo sexual harassment, under 
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the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendant because 
it found that since the plaintiff admitted that the defendant 
did not act hostilely towards her or attempt to coerce her 
after she declined his invitations to dinner, "no reasonable 
factfinder could conclude [the defendant's] attentions ever 
involved an implicit or explicit threat" of retaliation as 
required under NJLAD. See Lynch, 974 F. Supp. at 452 
(citing Lehman v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 
1993)). The District Court, noting that it found the 
reasoning in Lynch "persuasive," dismissed Farrell's quid 
pro quo claim because there was no further pressure or 
hostility after she rejected DeLong's advance. See Farrell, 
22 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88. 
 
However, our law contains no requirement that the 
plaintiff show that the employer implicitly or explicitly 
threatened retaliation when making the advance. We 
explained in Robinson that "the plaintiff must show that his 
or her response to unwelcome advances was subsequently 
used as a basis for a decision about compensation, etc. 
Thus, the plaintiff need not show that the submission was 
linked to compensation, etc., at or before the time when the 
advances occurred." Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1297 (emphasis 
added). While evidence of hostility or repeated demands for 
sexual favors would strengthen any plaintiff 's case, the 
lack of such evidence does not render it fatallyflawed. By 
following the reasoning of Lynch, the District Court 
narrowed its analysis of Farrell's evidence of causation by 
effectively engrafting an element onto the cause of action 
that is not required under our jurisprudence.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The District Court also cited Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132 
F.3d 20, 22, 28 (3d Cir. 1997) and Kidwell v. Sheetz, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 
1177, 1179-81 (W.D. Va. 1997) in a footnote. See Farrell, 22 F. Supp. 2d 
at 388 n.32. In Bonenberger, we did state, as the District Court 
contended, that the plaintiff 's supervisor "did not suggest, either by 
word or action, that sexual favors were the price for keeping her job." 
Farrell, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 388 n.32 (quoting Bonenberger, 132 F.3d at 
28). However, we read this statement in Bonenberger as part of the 
court's analysis of a subsection (1) claim that the plaintiff 's 
supervisor 
 
made a "veiled threat to have her fired for rejecting his sexual 
advances." 
 
See Bonenberger, 132 F.3d at 27. In Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, we 
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Robinson, however, as the District Court noted, does 
require the plaintiff to "show that his or her response was 
in fact used thereafter as a basis for a decision affecting his 
or her compensation, etc." Id.; Farrell, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 
387. As with Farrell's retaliation claim, the question 
becomes what evidence may the court consider in deciding 
whether that nexus is sufficiently proven to establish a 
prima facie case. While we recognize that a retaliation claim 
under Title VII and an adverse job discrimination claim are 
separately codified, compare 42 U.S.C.S 2000e-3(a), with 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a), we see no reason to conclude that 
Farrell's burden should be higher, or the scope of evidence 
permissibly considered narrower, in this cause of action for 
quid pro quo sexual harassment than in a retaliation claim. 
 
Our decision in Robinson, where we reversed the grant of 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, 
leads us to conclude that the analysis can be, in fact, quite 
broad. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1298-99. 8 In Robinson, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
said that a plaintiff could allege a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim 
when a supervisor implicitly or explicitly made a coercive request for 
sexual favors even without a subsequent effect on the terms and 
conditions of employment. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1297. Supreme 
Court precedent has, however, eroded that cause of action since our 
opinions in Robinson and Bonenberger. See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police 
Department, 174 F.3d 95, 120 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)). 
 
In Kidwell, a case relying upon the law of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, the district court dismissed the claim because the 
plaintiff failed to establish the second prong of the prima facie case 
which the court found required evidence of some form of threat. See 
Kidwell, 982 F. Supp. at 1180. 
 
8. A careful reading of Robinson makes it clear that the events 
substantiating the plaintiff 's quid pro quo claim which we found 
sufficient to go to a jury were distinct from those we found insufficient 
to establish her claim of retaliation. Robinson's quid pro quo claim 
involved the alleged block of her transfer request in 1993. See id. at 
1298-99. Robinson's retaliation claim revolved around a complaint she 
filed with the EEOC in May of 1994. See id.  at 1292, 1301-02. Robinson 
did not plead the facts of her quid pro quo allegations in the alternative 
as a retaliation claim, as Farrell has done here. 
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the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor blocked her transfer 
because she rejected his advance. See id. at 1298. At trial, 
the plaintiff testified that her supervisor had repeatedly 
promised her that he would recommend her for transfer but 
that after a party where he pulled her into a compromising 
position for a picture, he told her that after talking to 
others in the department, they said she had a bad attitude. 
See id. The plaintiff also testified that a co-worker 
confirmed that her supervisor blocked her transfer, had 
made negative comments about her to others, and had a 
romantic interest in her. See id. 
 
We conclude that the inquiry into whether a plaintiff has 
shown that a rejection of certain conduct was "used as the 
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual" 
should not be constrained; rather, the court can consider 
circumstantial evidence and draw inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party in reaching this determination on 
summary judgment. 
 
C. 
 
Thus, in cases where a plaintiff must illustrate a"causal 
link" for purposes of establishing retaliation, or show that 
certain conduct was "used" as a basis for employment 
decisions, a plaintiff may rely upon a broad array of 
evidence to do so. We will now review Farrell's evidence, 
which we find, when considered as a whole, and reviewed 
in the light most favorable to Farrell, adequately establishes 
the necessary connection to substantiate both her prima 
facie of retaliation and her prima facie case of quid pro quo 
sexual harassment.9 
 
As a preliminary matter, we disagree with the District 
Court's rejection of certain evidence regarding DeLong's 
reaction to Farrell's rejection of his advance on the flight to 
Puerto Rico.10 In her certification in opposition to Planters' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We note that Planters suggests the entire analysis of both the quid pro 
quo and retaliations claims should be joined together because of the 
similarity of the claims. See Appellee's Br. at 24 n.3. 
 
10. Planters points out in its brief that Farrell's affidavit accompanying 
her EEOC complaint did not state that DeLong put his hand on her 
knee. We also place no evidentiary consequence on this omission. 
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motion for summary judgment, Farrell explained that after 
she rejected DeLong's advance: 
 
       DeLong's demeanor changed, he turned to face away 
       from me, curled up and either slept or pretended to 
       sleep. We had little or no further conversation on the 
       flight, and I worked alone for the rest of theflight. The 
       following day DeLong abruptly left Puerto Rico and 
       returned to Winston-Salem without me. 
 
The District Court, citing Martin v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 851 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1988), refused 
to permit Farrell to rely on this proof that DeLong's 
demeanor changed, because the Court found that it 
impermissibly contradicted her deposition testimony in 
which she made no reference to this conduct. See Farrell, 
22 F. Supp. 2d at 381 n.22. We disagree with the District 
Court's rejection of this evidence because Farrell's 
deposition testimony and her certification are not 
contradictory in the sense prohibited by Martin . In Martin, 
the plaintiff 's certification included a different answer to 
the same question asked directly in her deposition. See 
Martin, 851 F.2d at 704-06. In this case, in Farrell's 
deposition, counsel for Planters specifically asked Farrell to 
only describe the content of conversations Farrell and 
DeLong had on the airplane. Farrell was never asked how 
DeLong responded to her rejection, what happened after 
she rebuffed him or how many conversations they had 
thereafter. The District Court concluded, and Planters 
argues here, that Farrell implied in her deposition that she 
and DeLong had conversations after his advance and 
therefore the substance of the two statements are 
contradictory. See Farrell, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 381 n.22 
(concluding that Farrell's deposition said that she and 
DeLong continued to talk but her certification said "he 
turned away from her and refused to talk to her"). However, 
Farrell's certification says that they "had little or no further 
conversation" after the advance. When asked to relate the 
conversations in her deposition, Farrell first explained that 
 
she was unable to relate the conversations in chronological 
order, agreed that they were merged together in her mind, 
and then tried to relate them as best as she could. Since 
Farrell was not asked about DeLong's attitude or demeanor, 
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and the District Court's conclusion rests upon an inference 
drawn from a narrow reading of the deposition and a broad 
reading of her certification, we disagree with the District 
Court and conclude that Farrell's later certification should 
be considered as evidence. 
 
The District Court also refused to place any significance 
on DeLong's decision to return to Puerto Rico a day early 
when considering whether Farrell had established evidence 
of hostility. The District Court reasoned that Farrell had 
presented no evidence that his decision was related to any 
issue other than Jungmann's possible termination. See id. 
at 388 (reviewing Farrell's quid pro quo claim). However, 
Farrell faces no separate burden to substantiate the 
inference she draws from this decision; rather, the district 
court is to draw inferences in her favor at this procedural 
stage. See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 164 (3d Cir. 
1999) (applying traditional summary judgment standards to 
evidence supporting the plaintiff 's prima facie case of 
reverse discrimination). Farrell is entitled to rely upon this 
event as circumstantial evidence. 
 
Farrell, obviously, places great significance upon the 
relatively close timing between her rejection of DeLong's 
advance and her termination. The District Court found the 
timing to be suggestive in its analysis of Farrell's retaliation 
claim but did not find it sufficient on its own. See Farrell, 
22 F. Supp. 2d at 393 (finding the timing not to be 
"unusually suggestive"). We view the timing of Farrell's 
termination as suggestive for both of Farrell's claims. The 
timing evidence is also enhanced by the occurrence of two 
other events. Although DeLong states that he recommended 
Bryan over Farrell based upon meetings with other 
members of Planters' management, and Planters points to 
complaints raised about Farrell's performance during her 
employment, his decision to terminate her came only three 
or four weeks after DeLong praised Farrell and asked her 
about her interest in a promotion. Further, although 
Planters justifies Farrell's termination in part because of 
economic concerns and management discussions that took 
place in November 1994, her termination occurred less 
than two-weeks after Planters purchased her house in 
Maryland and moved all of her possessions to Winston- 
Salem. 
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Farrell also augments evidence of DeLong's changed 
demeanor and the suggestive timing of her termination with 
evidence in the record revealing inconsistencies in Planters' 
explanation for terminating her. Farrell challenges both 
Planters' explanation that the decision to consolidate the 
departments was determined by management and its 
conclusion that the choice to retain Bryan was based upon 
interpersonal reasons. Planters states that discussions 
about consolidating the two departments began in 
November of 1994 and suggests that the decision was made 
by upper management. However, DeLong's December 8 
memorandum states that complaints he received about 
Farrell on December 6 and 7 motivated DeLong to see 
Eckenroth where they "discussed the option of eliminating 
the position of Senior Manager Packaging Development and 
combining Graphics and Packaging as per proposal dated 
8/20/93." Portions of DeLong's December 8 memorandum 
also place the decision to terminate Farrell solely in 
DeLong's hands and focus entirely on the alleged 
interpersonal conflicts as the reason for Farrell's dismissal. 
For example, DeLong wrote: "When all the issues with her 
peers were discussed and other feedback received 
discussed, it was clear that I had to deal with Susan" and 
explained that "Based on the discussions and conversations 
with people over the last several months who found Susan 
very difficult to work with . . . I made the decision to 
eliminate her job and combine Graphics and Packaging 
under Peggy as per earlier recommendation and hire 
another Packaging Engineer." Farrell also alleges that on 
the day Eckenroth and DeLong informed her of the decision 
to terminate her, Eckenroth told her that Planters would 
call the decision a position elimination for her benefit but 
that she was actually being terminated for interpersonal 
reasons. 
 
Farrell also adduces evidence surrounding the choice of 
Bryan over her to accompany the inference that DeLong 
made the decision on the basis of impermissible reasons. 
Although DeLong named both Lyons and Jabbour at the 
December 13 meeting as managers who made negative 
comments about her, Farrell alleges that neither Lyons nor 
Jabbour made such comments and supports her argument 
with reference to DeLong's memorandum that expressly 
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states Lyons found Farrell to be helpful. Furthermore, 
Farrell states that Lyons indicated to her that he told 
DeLong that DeLong seemed to have a personal problem 
with Farrell from the manner in which he solicited feedback 
about Farrell. 
 
Planters argues that none of these points help to raise 
the required inference. It urges that we should draw no 
inference from the timing of DeLong's suggestion of a 
promotion because Farrell was not terminated because she 
was incompetent, but because of a required consolidation 
and the determination that Bryan was a better choice than 
Farrell. Further, Planters points out that DeLong explained 
in his deposition that he discounted complaints about 
Farrell until late November and December because Farrell 
was new. Planters argues that nothing should be read into 
the trip to Puerto Rico because the trip was planned for 
DeLong before he asked her to join him and Farrell had 
been required to tour other facilities with DeLong. Planters 
disagrees that Farrell establishes any inconsistencies, 
arguing that the memorandum supports the view that 
DeLong responded to his meeting with Eckenroth by 
interviewing other managers and by subsequently choosing 
Bryan. 
 
We recognize that different inferences might be drawn 
from the evidence presented in the record. On summary 
judgment, however, when viewing the sufficiency of the 
prima facie case, our role is not to act as factfinder. 
Instead, we must consider the evidence taken in the light 
most favorable to the non-movant and determine whether 
Farrell can show the causation required for a prima facie 
case of retaliation and quid pro quo harassment. We believe 
that, taken as a whole, the behavior of DeLong, the timing 
of Farrell's termination and the inconsistencies she raised 
in Planters' explanation for her termination are sufficient to 
create the required inference. 
 
We recognize that by acknowledging that evidence in the 
causal chain can include more than demonstrative acts of 
antagonism or acts actually reflecting animus, we may 
possibly conflate the test for causation under the prima 
facie case with that for pretext. But perhaps that is 
inherent in the nature of the two questions being asked -- 
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which are quite similar. The question: "Did herfiring result 
from her rejection of his advance?" is not easily 
distinguishable from the question: "Was the explanation 
given for her firing the real reason?" Both should permit 
permissible inferences to be drawn in order to be answered. 
As our cases have recognized, almost in passing, evidence 
supporting the prima facie case is often helpful in the 
pretext stage and nothing about the McDonnell Douglas 
formula requires us to ration the evidence between one 
stage or the other. See Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 166 
(explicitly referring to the evidence of the prima facie case 
in finding evidence supporting pretext); Jalil , 873 F.2d at 
709 n.6 ("Although this fact is important in establishing 
plaintiff 's prima facie case, there is nothing preventing it 
from also being used to rebut the defendant's proffered 
explanation. As we have observed before, the McDonnell 
Douglas formula does not compartmentalize the evidence so 
as to limits its use only one phase of the case.") (internal 
quotation omitted) (citing and quoting Dillon v. Coles, 746 
F.2d 998, 1003 (3d Cir. 1984)). It is enough to note that we 
will not limit the kinds of evidence that can be probative of 
a causal link any more than the courts have limited the 
type of evidence that can be used to demonstrate pretext.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Since Robinson, which described the quid pro quo cause of action, we 
have not had occasion to focus on the extent to which the McDonnell 
Douglas burden shifting test applies to, or has implications for the 
elements of the prima facie case of, quid pro quo claims of this type. See 
Hurley, 174 F.3d at 120-22. We see no reason to explore these issues in 
this case. Neither party questions the District Court's standard or the 
application of the burden shifting structure. See Appellant's Br. at 28-29 
(adopting the District Court's standard and citing Kauffman v. Allied 
Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992)); Appellee's Br. at 25-26 
(adopting the District Court's standard and citing Perkovich v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1155, *9-10 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 
1997), and Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, No. CIV.A.96-403, 1996 
WL 729034, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 1996), aff 'd in part and rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 132 F.3d 20 (3d Cir. 1997)); EEOC's Br. at 26 
(arguing that a plaintiff need not show intervening hostility to prove 
quid 
 
pro quo harassment and applying the McDonnell Douglas test to the 
claim). Farrell only contends that the District Court erred in finding 
that 
 
she had not set forth enough evidence to establish the threshold causal 
relationship. 
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III. 
 
Farrell also appeals the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment to Planters on her North Carolina state 
contract law claim. Farrell argues that her move to North 
Carolina was consideration for promises that she would be 
fired only for cause and, thus, these promises became an 
implied term of her employment which Planters allegedly 
breached by firing her for retaliatory or discriminatory 
reasons. Farrell acknowledges that the North Carolina 
Supreme Court recently rejected the precise theory on 
which she is proceeding. See Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical 
Indust., Inc., 493 S.E.2d 420, 423-24 (N.C. 1997) (holding 
that there is not a "moving residences" exception to the 
general rule of at-will employment). However, Farrell argues 
that Kurtzman should not be applied to her case because 
her implied contract right vested, and the agreement was 
breached, before Kurtzman was decided. Farrell explains 
that the protection of contract rights based upon prior law 
is a compelling reason under North Carolina law counseling 
against the retrospective application of Kurtzman to bar her 
claim. The District Court had difficulty accepting this 
argument, as do we. We will affirm. 
 
In Kurtzman, the North Carolina Supreme Court held 
"that plaintiff-employee's change of residence in the wake of 
defendant-employer's statements here does not constitute 
additional consideration making what is otherwise an at- 
will employment relationship one that can be terminated by 
the employer only for cause." Id. at 423-24. The Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
In two cases decided before Robinson, we considered claims brought by 
plaintiffs under the same Title VII section alleging that they were 
terminated because they rejected a supervisor's explicitly coercive 
request for sexual favors. See Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, 721 F.2d 77, 78-80 
(3d Cir. 1983); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elect. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 
1047-49 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Bonenberger, 132 F.3d at 28 (citing 
Craig and Tomkins as quid pro quo precedent). Neither case detailed the 
elements of a prima facie test. However, in Craig we noted that the 
district court found causation as part of the prima facie case and applied 
the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in affirming the trial court's verdict for 
the plaintiff. See Craig, 721 F.2d at 79-80. 
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found assurances of job security such as " `If you do your 
job, you'll have a job'; `This is a long-term growth 
opportunity for you'; `This is a secure position'; and `We're 
offering you a career position' " insufficient to alter the at- 
will nature of the employment although the assurances 
preceded the plaintiff 's decision to move from 
Massachusetts to North Carolina. See id. at 421. 
 
In reaching its holding, the Court rejected precedent of 
the North Carolina's intermediary court establishing a 
"moving residence" exception to the at-will doctrine. See id. 
at 423 (rejecting Sides v. Duke Hospital, 328 S.E.2d 818 
(N.C. App.), disc. rev. denied, 333 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. 1985) 
and Burkheimer v. Gealy, 250 S.E.2d. 678 (N.C. App.), disc. 
rev. denied, 254 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. 1979)). The court also 
dismissed as "background discussion" language in Harris v. 
Duke Power Co., 356 S.E.2d 357 (N.C. 1987), mentioning 
Sides and the "moving residences" exception. See id. at 
423. The Court concluded that the argument that the 
exception was well established in the court's jurisprudence 
was incorrect. See id. Applying its holding to the case 
before it, where the plaintiff had won a jury verdict, the 
Court remanded to the trial court with direction to enter a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See id.  at 424. 
 
We agree with the District Court that Kurtzman  is 
dispositive despite the fact that Farrell moved to North 
Carolina before it was decided. The North Carolina 
Supreme Court has stated that "[u]nder long-established 
North Carolina law, a decision of a court of supreme 
jurisdiction overruling a former decision is, as a general 
rule, retrospective in its operation." Cox v. Haworth, 284 
S.E.2d 322, 324 (N.C. 1981). The Court further explained 
that: "Unless compelling reasons . . . exist for limiting the 
application of the new rule to future cases, we think that 
the overruling decision should be given retrospective effect." 
Id. The Court in Cox also noted that the decision as to 
whether a case ought to be applied retroactively should 
include consideration of policy issues as well, such as 
"reliance on the prior decision, the degree to which the 
purpose behind the new decision can be achieved solely 
through prospective application, and the effect of 
retroactive application on the administration of justice." Id. 
at 324. 
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Farrell, citing MacDonald v. Univ. of North Carolina, 263 
S.E.2d 578 (N.C. 1980), argues that protecting previously 
vested contract rights is a compelling reason which requires 
limiting the application of the rule announced in Kurtzman 
to cases involving promises made after it was decided. In 
MacDonald, the North Carolina Supreme Court explained: 
 
       When the law has received a given construction by a 
       court of last resort, and contracts have been made and 
       rights acquired under and in accord with such 
       construction, such contracts may not be invalidated 
       nor vested rights under them impaired by a change of 
       construction made by a subsequent decision. 
 
MacDonald, 263 S.E.2d at 581. However, as the District 
Court recognized, the facts of Farrell's case fail to support 
the exception described by MacDonald. Farrell would have 
us disregard the point made in Kurtzman that the "moving 
residence" exception to the at-will doctrine had never been 
established by the North Carolina Supreme Court. See 
Kurtzman, 493 S.E.2d at 423 ("Plaintiff 's contention that 
this exception is well established in our jurisprudence is 
incorrect. This Court has not heretofore expressly passed 
upon it."). It is telling that the North Carolina Supreme 
Court in Kurtzman did apply its rule to the case before it, 
remanding for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to be 
entered. We find no basis for not following its lead in this 
regard. 
 
We also believe that policy considerations point to the 
application of Kurtzman to bar claims invoking contracts 
allegedly made before it was decided. In Kurtzman, the 
Court focused upon at-will employment as a fundamental 
precept of law noting that exceptions to the rule should not 
be found to exist without "substantial justification 
grounded in compelling considerations of public policy." Id. 
at 423. The Court explained that allowing a "moving 
residences" exception, in a mobile society would create 
instability in an otherwise stable area of employment law. 
See id. at 423-24. The strength of these policy rationales 
suggests that the North Carolina court would not create a 
subset of employees who could avoid the holding in 
Kurtzman, and bring a claim based upon the "moving 
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residences" exception solely because the plaintiff moved 
before Kurtzman was decided. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Planters on Farrell's 
federal claims, and remand for further proceedings. We will, 
however, affirm the District Court's ruling precluding 
Farrell's state law breach of contract claim. 
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